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Introduction
A nation’s decision to pursue a public policy of
antidiscrimination often entails further choices
about how to identify the groups who suffer
discrimination and how to measure their socio-
economic disadvantage. In other words, the
adoption of antidiscriminatory policy leads to
somemechanism for categorising disadvantaged
groups. If ethnic discrimination is the target, a
means of classifying the po-
pulation by ethnicity nor-
mally follows.
The United States, how-
ever, has experienced this
process of antidiscrimination
and classiﬁcation in reverse.
Since its inception, the federal
government has enumerated
the US population by race, as
did the colonies that preceded
it. But racial discrimination
was not meaningfully prohib-
ited in the United States until
the civil rights movement of
the mid-twentieth century.




In a society that is already
as thoroughly racialised as the
United States, the introduction
of antidiscriminationmeasures raises a different set
of questions than it does for nations that have
traditionally forgone ethnic classiﬁcation. Instead
of asking why policymakers took a certain
approach to categorisation as a function of
antidiscrimination law, in the American case we
must ask how the new measures prohibiting
discrimination interacted with longstanding ideas
about racial difference. As we will see, the
legitimacy widely accorded to racial categories in
the United States means that its con-
troversies about the use of race statistics for anti-
discrimination purposes tend to call into question
the civil rights measures and not the classiﬁcation
system itself. This is a sharp
contrast to those nations
where the objective of elim-
inating discrimination is
widely shared but the use
of ethnic demarcation is
seen as problematic.
To address the ques-
tion of how the United
States’ policies of antidis-
crimination drew on exist-
ing notions of racial
difference – and on ofﬁcial
racial categories that were
traditionally used explicitly
for discriminatory pur-
poses – we structure this
article as follows. First, we
brieﬂy recount the history
of ofﬁcial racial classiﬁca-
tion practices in the United
States and their relation to
racist laws and practices.
Next we describe the development of legal
prohibitions on racial discrimination, culminat-
ing in the civil rights movement of the 1950s, 60s,
and 70s. This leads to an examination of how race
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data are used to implement civil rights law, before
outlining contemporary ofﬁcial racial categories.
Finally, we assess the debates that have arisen
concerning the collection of racial statistics for
the purposes of antidiscrimination enforcement.
In conclusion, we stress the challenges that
American notions of race pose for the deploy-
ment of antidiscriminatory policies.
Historical US racial
classification
TheUnited States’ contemporary application of its
longstanding racial categories to the battle against
discrimination is remarkable when we recall that
this ofﬁcial classiﬁcation scheme originated in the
government’s explicit policies of political, social
and economic exclusion of non-whites.
Race ﬁgured on the very ﬁrst US census –
that of 1790 – which divided the population into
‘‘Free White Males’’, ‘‘Free White Females’’,
‘‘All Other Free Persons’’, and ‘‘Slaves’’. These
categories marked both race and civil status
simultaneously, leaving little doubt as to their
interrelationship. Race explicitly distinguished
‘‘free whites’’ from ‘‘other free persons’’ (a
delineation required by the First Census Act of
March 1790), and it implicitly separated the free
from those enslaved, whowere presumably black.
The elision between race and civil status was
underpinned in the Constitution, Section 2 of
Article I which read, until altered by the 14th
Amendment in 1868: ‘‘Representatives and direct
taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective numbers, which
shall be determined by adding to the whole
number of free persons, including those bound to
service for a term of years, and excluding Indians
not taxed, three-ﬁfths of all other persons.’’
Racial enumeration thus served not only to
demarcate slaves – people within the nation but
alien to its rights – but also American Indians,
who were excluded from the polity as ‘‘foreign-
ers’’ on the lands that they had inhabited before
the arrival of Europeans.
In the nineteenth century, census race
categories continued to support racist public laws
and practices. As political scientist Melissa
Nobles (2000) and historian Paul Schor (2001)
have shown, census ofﬁcials expanded the
number of categories to include options like
‘‘mulatto’’ and ‘‘quadroon’’ in order to provide
scientists with data they believed would demon-
strate the perils of racial mixture. And the turn-
of-the-century retrenchment back to a single
‘‘Negro’’ category mirrored the post-Civil War
hardening of the ‘‘one-drop rule’’, whereby any
African ancestry was considered noxious enough
to entirely taint its bearer. Over the course of the
late nineteenth-century period known as ‘‘Re-
construction’’, a wave of state laws instituted
racial segregation in public facilities and social
contexts (e.g., forbidding interracial marriage),
and a succession of ‘‘one-drop’’ deﬁnitions of
race were crafted to enforce these segregationist
practices. As these examples suggest, racial
classiﬁcation was both an instrument and an
outgrowth of a state that was overtly committed
to discriminating against non-whites.
In such a political and social context, the use
of racial categories provoked little public scrutiny
or outcry, but rather constituted a perfectly ac-
ceptable – indeed necessary – marker of social
difference. This classiﬁcation scheme was under-
stood as delineating groups that were distin-
guished by deeply rooted differences of biology
and ancestry (Smedley 1999), which in turn dic-
tated different social and political roles. Nor did
the fact that the number and labels of census race
categories varied from census to census often raise
questions about the validity of the classiﬁcations
(Bennett 2000, Haney Lo´pez 1996, Lee 1993),
perhaps since the sole constant was the ‘‘White’’
category used and approved by the numerically
and socially dominant majority. As a result, the
classiﬁcation of the population by race had long
enjoyed widespread legitimacy and acceptance in
the United States by the time the question of how
to implement antidiscriminatory measures arose





The United States’ legal apparatus for protec-
tion against discrimination traces its roots to the
Constitution, the ‘‘supreme law of the land’’,
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which was ofﬁcially adopted in 1789. Moreover,
subsequent amendments to the Constitution
play a major role in antidiscrimination law
today. Chief among these are the First Amend-
ment (ratiﬁed in 1791), which protects freedom
of religious worship; the 14th Amendment (1868)
guaranteeing equal protection under the law; the
15th Amendment (1870) ensuring citizens’ right
to vote regardless of ‘‘race’’ or ‘‘colour’’; and the
19th Amendment (1920) guaranteeing the same
right to vote regardless of sex.
As is well known, however, the existence of
such legal provisions did not preclude widely
sanctioned public and private practices of the
most discriminatory nature. Race-based slavery
continued until 1865, and even after passage of
the 15th Amendment, blacks were effectively
disenfranchised through unfair poll require-
ments, intimidation, and violence (Marx,
1998). Although the nation’s ﬁrst civil rights
laws were passed in this post-Civil War ‘‘Re-
construction’’ period, the failure to enforce them
rendered them virtually meaningless. In fact,
many of the state ‘‘Black Codes’’ and ‘‘Jim
Crow’’ statutes forbidding social interaction
between blacks and whites were adopted during
(and in reaction to) Reconstruction, regardless
of non-whites’ new constitutional protections
(Woodward 1974). Moreover, nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century courts routinely inter-
preted the Constitution as being consistent with
segregationist principles that would now be
considered discriminatory. Perhaps most pro-
minent among these decisions is the 1896 Plessy
v. Ferguson case (163 US 537 (1896)), in which
the Supreme Court found that ‘‘separate but
equal’’ accommodations for different races were
not in violation of the 14th Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.
The most extensive development of anti-
discrimination protections to date – and the
source of most of today’s law in this arena –
emerged from the civil rights movement of the
1950s, 60s, and 70s. One of the earliest and most
widely hailed steps in this process was the 1954
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka decision
(347 US 483 (1954)), in which the Supreme
Court overturned the Plessy principle of ‘‘sepa-
rate but equal’’ to rule that racially segregated
schools were inherently unequal. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of
1965 were also milestones of this era, and they
spurred a tide of subsequent laws such as the
Fair Housing Act of 1968, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Equal
Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, and
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974.
In retracing the historical evolution of US
antidiscrimination protection, it must be noted
that afﬁrmative action was not an element of the
early wave of civil rights legislation, but rather
such programmes came to be undertaken later as
strategies for preventing or addressing charges
of discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1964,
for example, did not push beyond antidiscrimi-
nation measures to institute preferential treat-
ment goals. By the early 1970s, however, the
‘‘equal opportunity’’ rhetoric of the civil rights
movement seemed insufﬁcient to counter en-
trenched patterns of discrimination, and Pre-
sident Nixon approved the use of numerical
quotas in construction-industry hiring as part of
what became known as the Philadelphia Plan.
This local experiment served as the blueprint for
regulations that would later be applied to all
private federal contractors, requiring them to
establish statistical ‘‘goals and timetables’’
under the supervision of the Department of
Labour’s Ofﬁce of Federal Contract Compli-
ance Programmes (OFCCP). Similarly, minority
‘‘set-aside’’ programmes emerged in the 1970s,
requiring government contracts to dedicate a
certain proportion of funds for minority ﬁrms.
The Philadelphia Plan and its descendants
illustrate the use of what has come to be called
‘‘hard’’ afﬁrmative action – such as mandatory
hiring quotas – as distinct from ‘‘soft’’ measures
like special recruitment or outreach (Swain 2001).
The distinction is important because hard afﬁr-
mative action has met with public resistance since
its introduction, and it continues to provoke
widespread outcry today (Sabbagh 2003).
Contemporary antidiscrimination law
and policy
Today United States law at the federal, state,
and local levels includes antidiscrimination pro-
visions on the basis of race, along with colour
and national origin. Racial discrimination is
prohibited in a wide range of sectors, including
employment, education, voting, housing, public
accommodations, credit, and banking.
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As described previously, US legal protec-
tion against racial discrimination is grounded
both in the Constitution and in more recent
statutory law. With regard to the former, the
14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and
the 15th Amendment’s protection of voting
rights are central. However, the two Amend-
ments represent distinct approaches to the
recognition of difference in the service of
antidiscrimination. Whereas the 15th Amend-
ment explicitly names race as a form of
difference that cannot underpin discrimination
(in matters of voting rights speciﬁcally), the 14th
Amendment requires ‘‘equal protection’’ with-
out specifying any particular class of individuals
whose protection is to be assured. Yet to date the
Equal Protection Clause has not been inter-
preted as embracing a strict principle of colour-
blindness that would preclude the state from
drawing distinctions on the basis of race. In
recent years, the Supreme Court’s case law has
gestured toward equating the Equal Protection
Clause with the principle of colour-blindness, by
considering that classiﬁcations based on race are
inherently ‘‘suspect’’ and should trigger the most
exacting level of judicial scrutiny (Calve`s 1998,
pp. 191–219).1 As a practical matter, this means
that race-based classiﬁcations are now allowed
to stand only if they are proved to be ‘‘narrowly
tailored’’ – that is, strictly indispensable – in
achieving a ‘‘compelling state purpose’’.2 But the
Court has never gone so far as to establish a
general prohibition on the use of race classiﬁca-
tions by state authorities, thereby leaving them
free to set up race-conscious antidiscrimination
and afﬁrmative action policies within certain
parameters.3
In addition to the competing ‘‘colour-
blind’’ versus ‘‘race-conscious’’ approaches to
outlawing discrimination, the Supreme Court
has also established two distinct bases for
identifying the existence of discrimination.
‘‘Disparate treatment’’ cases seek to demon-
strate that an individual or group has been
treated differently (e.g., by an employer) on
account of their race. In such cases, evidence of
discriminatory acts is crucial. In contrast,
‘‘disparate impact’’ law revolves around race
differentials in outcomes. In that case, courts
may make ﬁndings of discrimination on the
basis of unequal impact even when it is
considered to result from facially neutrally
employment practices. As we will discuss in
greater detail below, disparate impact law has
been the gateway for the introduction of
statistics as evidence of discrimination.
Use of racial statistics in
antidiscrimination law and
policy
Quantitative data that are classiﬁed by race have
played a major role in the implementation and
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws since the
1960s. In particular, statistical analysis of
potential patterns of racial discrimination has
been most commonly applied in the areas of
employment, education, and voting. In these
realms, numerical targets are also routinely
required, further necessitating the collection
and analysis of quantitative data. Below we
focus on two of the ﬁelds in which the applica-
tion of statistical data on race to antidiscrimina-
tion is most extensive today in the United States:
voting rights and employment.
Voting rights
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits states
or subdivisions from using any ‘‘standard,
practice or procedure’’ for voting that will deny
or ‘‘abridge’’ the right to vote ‘‘on account of
race or colour’’ or because a citizen ‘‘is a member
of a language minority’’ (this last concern was
added in 1975). As amended, the Act considers
that abridgement is found when ‘‘based on the
totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are
not equally open to participation by members of
a class of citizens protected by [the Voting
Rights Act] (. . .) in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electo-
rate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice.’’ (Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Public Law
No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131). To ascertain whether
such a violation had been committed, in 1982
Congress suggested a list of ‘‘typical factors’’,
several of which were contingent on a clear
means of delineating population group bound-
aries with great precision: the presence of
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racially polarised voting – that is, a signiﬁcant
and systematic opposition between the electoral
preferences of different racial groups; continu-
ing minority disadvantages in various spheres;
the unresponsiveness of elected ofﬁcials to the
particular needs of minority groups; and the
repeated electoral failure of the ‘‘chosen repre-
sentative[s]’’ of a particular racial group (Thorn-
burgh v. Gingles, 478 US 30 (1986), at 68
[Brennan, J., plurality opinion]; another of those
‘‘typical factors’’ is whether ‘‘racial appeals’’
were made during the electoral campaign by one
or several of the competing candidates). In order
to assess the latter, one was to consider ‘‘the
extent to which members of the minority group
have been elected to public ofﬁce in the
jurisdiction’’ (Thornburgh v. Gingles, 36–7) and,
more speciﬁcally, the potential existence of a
signiﬁcant discrepancy between the percentage
of blacks and Hispanics among the elected
representatives and their proportion in the
district’s population (to be assessed on the basis
of census data).
Moreover, in case there is evidence of such
‘‘dilution’’ of minority voting power, the Con-
gressional remedy consists of a redistricting
process speciﬁcally designed to increase the
number of black and Hispanic representatives.
Such redistricting requires racial data on at least
two grounds. First, according to the 1986
Thornburgh v. Gingles Supreme Court decision,
a minority group ﬁling a complaint must show
that it is large enough to form a numerical
majority (i.e., greater than 50%) in a redrawn
district. Second, if this condition is met, some
‘‘minority-majority’’ districts will be drawn in
which blacks and Hispanics will be concentrated
so as to increase the probability that they will be
in a position to elect ‘‘the candidate of their
choice’’ – ‘‘concentration’’ meaning that mem-
bers of these two groups will represent 65% of
the population of the district.
Consequently, the ‘‘results’’ standard of
contemporary Voting Rights Act litigation relies
heavily upon racially classiﬁed data, particularly
that provided by the Census Bureau. Indeed, the
Bureau is legally required to provide population
data on race and Hispanic ethnicity to state
authorities responsible for drawing up redis-
tricting plans (Public Law 94-171 (1975)).
However, the Supreme Court has since moved
to curb the use of race in redistricting: its 1995
decision Miller v. Johnson holds that the state
cannot use race as the ‘‘predominant’’ factor in
drawing a district’s boundaries.4
Employment
Covering private employers with 15 or more
employees, as well as federal, state, and local
governments, educational institutions, employ-
ment agencies and labour unions, the 1964 Civil
Rights Act (as amended) prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, colour, religion,
national origin, and sex in access to public
accommodations (Title II), access to all pro-
grammes subsidised by the federal government
(Title VI) and in employment (Title VII). The
Act also established the US Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), charging it
with enforcing Title VII by investigating com-
plaints of unlawful discrimination in employ-
ment. Similarly, Executive Order 11246 (1965)
simultaneously prohibited employment discri-
mination and created the Ofﬁce of Federal
Contract Compliance Programmes (OFCCP)
in the US Department of Labor to enforce its
provisions. As amended, the Order prohibits
discrimination in hiring or employment deci-
sions on the basis of race, colour, gender,
religion, and national origin, applying to all
non-exempt government contractors and sub-
contractors and federally assisted construction
contracts and subcontracts in excess of $10,000
(Ofﬁce of Federal Contract Compliance Pro-
grammes, 2002). Moreover, EO 11246 requires
that contractors and subcontractors with a
federal contract of $50,000 or more and 50 or
more employees develop a written afﬁrmative
action programme.
Along with the US Department of Justice,
the EEOC and the OFCCP have played a central
role in the application of racial statistics to
antidiscrimination law. They did so by develop-
ing and promoting the legal theory of discrimi-
nation as ‘‘disparate impact’’ in the mid-1960s,
as they sought to implement and enforce the new
civil rights legislation (Blumrosen 1993, 1994).
Disparate impact cases have been more amen-
able to statistical analysis because they are more
likely than disparate treatment charges to
concern broad groupings of individuals (as in
race- or gender-based class-wide discrimination
suits). As a result, disparate impact law draws
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more heavily on data about group representa-
tion in a particular industry or occupation – the
kind of data that lend themselves more readily to
statistical analysis. In addition, disparate impact
cases have also proven more likely to result
in the establishment of an afﬁrmative action
programme as a remedy for discrimination
(Landsberg, 1997), thereby giving rise to sub-
sequent use of quantitative data.
Inﬂuenced by the legal theory developed by
EEOC and OFCCP attorneys, the Supreme
Court came to embrace the disparate-impact
approach in its unanimous 1971 decision,Griggs
v. Duke Power Company (401 US 424 (1971)). In
this milestone case, which concerned an osten-
sibly colour-blind testing requirement that was
in fact designed to exclude black workers, since
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act no longer
permitted employers to do so openly, the Court
declared that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not
prohibit only intentional discrimination; it also
banned hiring practices that were ‘‘fair in form
but discriminatory in operation’’ – such as tests
which, ‘‘though facially neutral (...), would have
the effect of freezing the status quo created by
past discrimination’’ (Griggs v. Duke Power
Company, 430–1; for legal precedents of ‘‘dis-
parate impact’’ theory and the ‘‘business neces-
sity’’ standard in earlier voting, school
desegregation, and employment cases, see
Landsberg 1997, pp. 127–129). Thus the Court
enlarged the meaning of the term ‘‘discrimina-
tion’’ to include within the purview of Title VII
all forms of indirect discrimination, that is,
hiring practices that do not rely on any of the
unlawful grounds for employment decisions
listed in the Civil Rights Act (race, colour,
religion, sex, or national origin), but which still
work to the disadvantage of a disproportionate
number of minority group members who were
targeted for ofﬁcial, intentional discrimination
in the past. In short, actual minority employ-
ment had become the measure of ‘‘discrimina-
tion’’, which meant that ‘‘antidiscrimination’’
was now ofﬁcially conceived as a results-
oriented and group-centred policy.
The Griggs case not only established the
doctrine of disparate impact, but it simulta-
neously sanctioned the use of statistical data as
acceptable proof of discrimination. Since a
statistical imbalance in the racial distribution
of the workforce was now considered as
evidence of discrimination (unless the recruit-
ment procedure producing it could be justiﬁed as
a matter of ‘‘business necessity’’), statistical data
were obviously – if implicitly – required both to
document the ‘‘disparate impact’’ of employ-
ment practices and to devise an afﬁrmative
action programme designed to correct it. More-
over, statistical proof of unequal outcomes
could be accepted as sufﬁcient evidence of
disparate-impact discrimination, whereas statis-
tical evidence was only one ingredient, neither
sufﬁcient nor necessary, for a ﬁnding of (inten-
tional) disparate treatment.
As for what actually constituted a measure
of ‘‘disparate impact’’ or ‘‘adverse impact’’, the
next critical step came with the August 1978
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro-
cedures, a document that was supposed to draw
up operational prescriptions that the EEOC and
the OFCCP could rely on in their enforcement
activities. The key point was the following:
For any hiring test used by a ﬁrm subject to Title VII
requirements, if the success rate achieved by any racial,
ethnic or gender group is less than four-ﬁfths of the rate of
the most successful group, the test will be considered to
have an adverse impact on the ﬁrst group. (28 CFR § 50. 14
(1978), First part, §4)5
Under this ‘‘four-ﬁfths rule’’, a hiring test that
50% of white applicants passed but fewer than
40%of black applicants passed would have to be
withdrawn and replaced by another test devoid
of any adverse impact on women or ethno-racial
minorities. This standard remains in wide use
today, particularly in the Ofﬁce of Federal
Contract Compliance Programme’s (OFCCP)
monitoring of federal contractors. It is made
possible by the Civil Rights Act’s requirement
(Title VII of the 1964 Act, Section 709 c) that all
covered employers make and preserve records of
the racial breakdown of their workforces and
applicant pools.
Since the 1971 Griggs ruling, disparate-
impact theory has become widely established in
US antidiscrimination law, yet it has faced
challenge as well. On one hand, the disparate-
impact interpretation of Title VII was upheld in
subsequent employment discrimination cases
like Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody (422 US
405, 1975), and it was incorporated into
statutory law by way of the Civil Rights Act of
1991. On the other hand, adverse impact law had
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been circumscribed by the Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio (490 US 642 (1989)) and Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins (490 US 228 (1989))
decisions of 1989, in which the Supreme Court
made it more difﬁcult to bring charges of
discrimination, ruling that simple statistical
comparisons were insufﬁcient to make a prima
facie case, and that the burden of proof lay with
the plaintiff to prove illegitimate criteria behind
employment practices (rather than employers
being required to justify their practices).
Although these 1989 rulings were subsequently
and expressly invalidated by the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, they reﬂected a broader political shift
coinciding with the transition from Democratic
to Republican administrations in the 1980s – a
shift away from the class-based claims of
institutional discrimination that typiﬁed dispa-
rate impact litigation, toward an enforcement
focus on individual complaints of disparate
treatment (Wasby, 1995). Similarly, the Reagan
administration curtailed the Justice Depart-
ment’s previous position that disparate impact
theory was applicable beyond the realm of
employment – for example, to fair housing law
– limiting it instead to Title VII (employment)
cases only Landsberg, 1997. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court clearly blocked the extension of
adverse impact doctrine to the arena of con-
stitutional law early on, inWashington v. Davis,
426 US 229 (1976). As a result, cases brought
under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution require a showing of disparate
treatment, or intentional discrimination.
Beyond the monitoring of antidiscrimina-
tion law strictly conceived, the collection of data
on race and ethnicity is also required by the
implementation of afﬁrmative action pro-
grammes. With respect to employment in
particular, in 1969 the OFCCP issued ‘‘Order
No. 4’’ requiring all ﬁrms with federal contracts
over $50,000 and more than 50 employees to
devise an afﬁrmative action programme and to
set ‘‘goals and timetables’’ in order to remedy
any ‘‘underutilisation’’ of their area’s available
minority workforce. The failure of federal
contractors to comply with that Order could
result in termination of their federal contracts
and debarment from future contracts (Executive
Order 11246 (1965), Section 209(a)). This new
requirement was all the more effective because it
permitted the OFCCP to scrutinise an employer
without having to wait for an individual
complaint to materialise.
However, the question of how exactly to
measure minority underutilisation has been
subject to debate, much like the uncertainty that
gave rise to the ‘‘four-ﬁfths’’ measure of
discrimination. Originally, underutilisation was
to be determined by comparing an employer’s
workforce to the total number of unemployed
black and Hispanic workers living in the vicinity
of the ﬁrm’s production unit, whether qualiﬁed
or unqualiﬁed for the job at issue. Data on the
local area workforce would be available from
the census (and this usually held true regardless
of the benchmark population selected). But in
1977, the Supreme Court began to delimit the
appropriate benchmark population more nar-
rowly for the purposes of underutilisation
analysis, suggesting that comparison should be
made to minorities in the area who possessed the
requisite job skills for the position being
evaluated. As the Court made clear in Hazel-
wood School District v. United States (433 US
299 (1977)), ‘‘when special qualiﬁcations are
required to ﬁll particular jobs, comparisons to
the general population (rather than to the
smaller group of individuals who possess the
necessary qualiﬁcations) may have little proba-
tive value.’’ (308, n.13).6
As the review above describes, the use of
racial statistics was an integral feature of the
development of antidiscrimination law in the
United States. Not only did courts sanction the
use of racially classiﬁed data, but they gave
guidance to legal parties concerning the accep-
table statistical analysis of such information. In
the next section, we examine the classiﬁcation
practices that shape the racial statistics that are




Origin of the Federal racial
classification standards
As part of their work implementing the new civil
rights legislation, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) and Ofﬁce of
Federal Contract Compliance Programmes
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(OFCCP) jointly developed a single racial
classiﬁcation framework that would permit
comparison of the data they collected nation-
wide. Their early efforts, incorporated in Stan-
dard Form 100 (or Employer Information Report
EEO-1), would become the kernel of the United
States’ ofﬁcial racial classiﬁcation framework
(Graham, 2002). Although the federal govern-
ment had routinely employed racial categories
since its founding – most notably on the
decennial census – it did not promulgate an
ofﬁcial, ﬁxed set of racial groupings until the
mid-twentieth century growth of antidiscrimina-
tion law made new demands on its data
collection procedures.
Drafted by a joint EEOC - OFCCP
Reporting Committee in 1966, Standard Form
100 (EEO-1) was sent by both agencies to
every employer in their jurisdiction. From
then on, all ﬁrms with more than 50 employees
and a contract with the federal government
and all ﬁrms with more than 100 employees –
regardless of whether they had a contract
with the federal government – were asked to
provide, on a yearly basis, a document showing
the distribution of their workforce broken
down by gender, by job group, and by ethno-
racial identity. Despite the wide usage of this
standardised form, however, the racial cate-
gories it employed were not the product of
public debate or independent examination of
whether they ﬁt any theory of social justice or
equity. Government ofﬁcials simply ‘‘categor-
ized some groups as ‘minorities’ – a never-
deﬁned term that basically meant ‘analogous to
blacks’ ’’ – without ever ‘‘spell[ing] out what
were the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions or
qualities for minority-hood’’ (Skrentny 2002,
pp. 12–13).
Initially, the civil rights agencies considered
extending antidiscrimination protection to white
ethnic groups. In 1971, the OFCCP proposed
guidelines maintaining that ‘‘experience has
indicated that members of various religious
Swearing in new US citizens at a naturalization ceremony in New York, July 2004. Spencer Platt/Getty Images/AFP
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groups, primarily Jews and Catholics, and
members of certain ethnic groups, primarily of
Eastern, Middle, and Southern European an-
cestry, such as Italians, Greeks, and Slavic
groups, continue to be excluded from executive,
middle-management, and other job levels be-
cause of discrimination based on their religion/
national origin. These guidelines are intended to
remedy such unfair treatment.’’ (Federal Regis-
ter, vol. 36, n. 250, December 29, 1971).
However, this proposal was ultimately aban-
doned because it conﬂicted with the identiﬁca-
tion procedure preferred by the EEOC and
OFCCP, namely that of observer (or ‘‘external’’)
identiﬁcation. As explained in various internal
memorandums, ‘‘Current afﬁrmative action
programmes (. . .) which apply to minority
groups and women concern people with un-
changing physical attributes which are typically
observable. Identifying such persons as targets
for afﬁrmative action is relatively simple. (. . .) It
would not require invasions of privacy. . .’’
(Federal Register, vol. 36, n. 250, December 29,
1971, pp. 287, 298). White ethnics and members
of religious minorities, however, could not be
identiﬁed by a visual survey, and proceeding
through self-identiﬁcation would arguably jeo-
pardise such ‘‘privacy’’ and infringe on the
principle of the separation of church and state
enshrined in the First Amendment. Besides, the
extent of interethnic mixing would have made
the extension of afﬁrmative action to Poles or
Slovaks an administrative nightmare, it was
argued (no one thought that the same might be
said of interracial mixing at some point). Also,
constraints of time and resources reinforced the
unspoken principle that there was a threshold of
victimhood that a group was required to meet
before policy recognition was available, that
threshold being implicitly deﬁned by the extent
of the still-perceptible, present effects of past
discrimination.
Historian David Hollinger (1995) has
dubbed the resultant classiﬁcation framework
‘‘the ethno-racial pentagon’’, because it incor-
porated ﬁve relevant categories: black, white,
Native Americans, ‘‘Orientals’’ – later to be
renamed ‘‘Asians’’ – and ‘‘Spanish-surnamed
individuals’’ – later to be called ‘‘Hispanic’’.
This classiﬁcatory scheme was subsequently
codiﬁed and extended to all federal agencies in
1977, and has remained in place ever since.
Statistical Directive 15: Introduction
of the Federal Racial Standards
As new civil rights laws went into effect in the
1960s and 1970s, government ofﬁcials increas-
ingly perceived the need for a uniform set of
racial categories that would facilitate the ex-
change and combination of data collected by the
myriad federal agencies now required to enforce
antidiscrimination law to some degree – includ-
ing, in addition to institutions like the OFCCP
or EEOC the primary objective of which is the
enforcement of civil rights law, several other
federal agencies that also hold some responsi-
bility for guaranteeing antidiscrimination pro-
tection, such as the US Department of
Education’s Ofﬁce of Civil Rights, the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development’s
Ofﬁce of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity,
the Departments of Transportation and of
Health and Human Services, and the Federal
Communications Commission (US Department
of Justice, 2002). In the early 1970s, different
agencies employed different categorisation
schemes (Edmonston et al. 1996). As a result,
in 1974 the Federal Interagency Committee
created an Ad Hoc Committee on Racial and
Ethnic Deﬁnitions to develop a uniform set of
designations. The Committee’s report, issued in
1975, would become the basis for the federal
racial classiﬁcation standards established two
years later.
In 1977, the Ofﬁce of Management and
Budget (OMB) issued Statistical Policy Direc-
tive 15 establishing the racial and ethnic
categories to be used by all federal agencies.
Although technically limited to the activities of
federal agencies, this scheme has come to be
adopted by state and local governments as well
as private sector actors and academic research-
ers. The four race categories speciﬁed in
Directive 15 were:
F American Indian or Alaskan Native
F Asian or Paciﬁc Islander
F Black
F White
In addition, the Directive designated an ethnic
category: ‘‘Hispanic’’, to include persons ‘‘of
Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or
South American or other Spanish culture or
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origin, regardless of race’’ (Edmonston et al.
1996, p. 66).
The treatment of Hispanics as a cultural but
not a racial group reﬂects the unique route that
led to ofﬁcial recognition of the Latino popula-
tion. The other four categories were present in
some form on the census as far back as the
nineteenth century; for example, the 1870 enu-
meration included the categories ‘‘White’’,
‘‘Black’’, ‘‘Chinese’’, and ‘‘Indian’’. In contrast,
the seed of a Hispanic category did not appear
until 1930, when the census introduced ‘‘Mex-
ican’’ as a racial category. This designation
surfaced in the context of a growing Mexican
immigration stream that was all the more
conspicuous after immigration from Europe
had been severely restricted in the early 1920s,
and immigration from Asia had been entirely
banned (Ngai 1999). However, the category was
eliminated before the next census, due to opposi-
tion from both Mexican-American organisations
such as the League of United Latin American
Citizens (LULAC) in Texas, as well as the
Mexican Ambassador in Washington. In parti-
cular, they objected to the classiﬁcation of
Mexican Americans as a distinct, non-white race,
especially in the context of a struggle against
growing school segregation in the Southwest, in
which being recognised as white by the federal
censusmattered a great deal. In subsequent years,
however, census ofﬁcials sought to enumerate
native Spanish speakers and/or those individuals
with Spanish surnames (Gibson & Jung 2002). In
short, after rejecting the equation of Mexican
origin with a race, demographers redeﬁned the
population as an ethnic group – that is, distinctive
in cultural (primarily linguistic) terms only,
rather than in the biological sense commonly –
if not explicitly – associated with race.
The concept of a pan-ethnic ‘‘Hispanic’’
population was still new when the Census
Bureau incorporated the term on the 1970
census, at a time when the ﬁrst afﬁrmative
action programmes were being set up. Yet fairly
soon after, Congress passed the 1976Roybal Act
requiring the Bureau and other federal statistical
agencies to produce separate counts of persons
of Hispanic origin (Public Law 94–311 (1976)).
However, the implementation of this item has
not been straightforward, as the census question
on Hispanic ethnicity has been plagued by high
non-response rates. Thus, in 1990, the Hispanic-
origin question had the highest ‘‘allocation rate’’
of any item on the census questionnaire (the
‘‘allocation rate’’ being the technical term for the
percentage of non-responses to a speciﬁc ques-
tion, for whichmissing values are then imputed).
Fully 10% of those responses had to be imputed,
which is substantially higher than the allocation
rate for any other census questions.Most of those
who failed to respond to the Hispanic-origin
question were non-Hispanics who mistakenly
assumed that it did not apply to them, even
though the ﬁrst listed response was ‘‘No (not
Spanish/Hispanic)’’. But others were Hispanics
who confounded race and ethnicity. They re-
sponded to the race question by turning to the
‘‘other race’’ category, where they wrote in
‘‘Hispanic’’ or, more likely, a national origin
(for example, ‘‘Mexican’’). When these indivi-
duals came to the Hispanic-origin question a few
items later, they skipped over it, believing it to be
superﬂuous. And the absence of some form of a
Hispanic option on the census race question has
led to relatively high non-response rates on the
part of Hispanics for that question as well. After
the 1990 census, one proposed improvement was
to incorporate the separate Hispanic-origin
question into the race question, making ‘‘Hispa-
nic’’ one of several items listed under the race
heading. This step would also make census
categories consistent with the prevailing usage
in law and politics – not to mention popular and
media usage – where Hispanics, along with other
minorities, have become one of the main
protected groups under the current antidiscrimi-
nation regime. And initially, most Hispanic
advocacy organisations supported the proposed
change (see generally Rodrı´guez 2000). However,
after research conducted by the Bureau of
Labour Statistics in 1995 suggested that such a
revision would depress the national count of
Latinos, support for the proposal quickly eroded.
Evolution of Statistical Directive 15
Since Directive 15 established the ﬁve ethno-
racial categories to be used in federal collection
and analysis of racial statistics, it has been
revised only once, in 1997 (OMB 1997). One
element of this change was to split the ‘‘Asian
and Paciﬁc Islander’’ group into two categories:
‘‘Asian’’ and ‘‘Native Hawaiian and Other
Paciﬁc Islander’’. The most widely publicised
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revision – and the issue that drove OMB’s
reassessment of the racial standards in the ﬁrst
place – was the move to permit the collection of
multiple-race responses. Prior to 1997, indivi-
duals could only be afﬁliated with one racial
group on ofﬁcial records; since then, an indivi-
dual may be identiﬁed with any combination of
the standard racial groups. This change was
perhapsmost publicly visible on the 2000 census,
which included the instructions ‘‘Mark one or
more races’’ for the ﬁrst time.
The revision of Directive 15 was not under-
taken because federal agencies saw a need for
multiple-race data. Indeed, many long-time
analysts of racial data felt the change would
hinder the enforcement of civil rights law (e.g.,
Harrison 2002). Instead, the revisionwas adopted
to allow respondents to report their race or races
in accordance with the way they subjectively
identiﬁed themselves, and to do so in the highly
symbolic venue of the national census. At issue
were expressive considerations, not distributive
ones, as conceived by the members and offspring
of interracial marriages, the number of which has
grown steadily since the Supreme Court’s 1967
Loving v. State of Virginia decision, which struck
down all state bans on interracial unions.
In addition to the ﬁve racial categories now
promulgated by the revised Directive 15 – i.e.,
‘‘American Indian or Alaska Native’’, ‘‘Asian’’,
‘‘Black or African American’’, ‘‘Native Hawai-
ian or Other Paciﬁc Islander’’, and ‘‘White’’ –
the Census Bureau enjoys a special dispensation
to include a ‘‘Some other race’’ category. This
total of six race options makes for 63 potential
single-andmultiple-race categories, consisting of
six mono-racial categories and 57 categories for
biracial and multiracial respondents. And since
there are two ethnic categories – Hispanic and
not Hispanic – the population can now be
categorised into 126 unique racial and ethnic
combinations. Given the potential complexity of
the resultant record-keeping and tabulation for
employers, not to mention analysis by enforce-
ment agencies, in 2000 the OMB issued Bulletin
00-02, ‘‘Guidance on Aggregation and Alloca-
tion of Data on Race for Use in Civil Rights
Monitoring and Enforcement’’ (OMB 2000).
This guidance gave enforcement agencies per-
mission to collect data using a limited schedule
of racial/ethnic classiﬁcations, namely the sin-
gle-race categories named above plus four dual-
race combinations – white/black; white/Asian;
white/American Indian; and black/Indian – as
well as any other multiple-race combination that
surpasses 1% of the population under study.
According to the Census Bureau, in 2000
the US population – a total of 281.4 million
persons – was 75.1% white, 12.3% black, 3.6%
Asian, and 0.9% Native American (Grieco &
Cassidy 2001). In addition, 2.4% of the popula-
tion chose two or more races, and 12.5%
identiﬁed themselves as Hispanic. Moreover,
5.5% selected the ‘‘Some other race’’ box alone;





The intersection of statistics and antidiscrimina-
tion has not been uncontroversial in the United
States. However, public concern about the links
between them has revolved largely around the
belief that the application of racial classiﬁcation
to civil rights is antithetical to meritocracy and
discriminates against whites. In other words, it is
ambivalence about antidiscrimination policies –
especially afﬁrmative action – that shape public
feeling about racially categorised data collection
and analysis. In this connection, it must be noted
that afﬁrmative action remains unpopular with a
majority of the American public (Sniderman &
Carmines 1997, Sniderman & Piazza 1993) and
has been challenged repeatedly over time. In
contrast, a review of the most high-proﬁle recent
debates over racial classiﬁcation points to the
fundamental lack of opposition to the act of
ofﬁcial racial categorisation itself.
Debate over multiple-race
classification
As described above, the decision to permit
multiple-race responses was greeted with dismay
in some quarters. One line of argument came
from African American political leaders, who
feared that many blacks would avail themselves
of the option to ‘‘dilute’’ their racial afﬁliation
by checking off more than one census box. That
worry proved to be largely unfounded, as blacks
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were the minority group least likely to choose
multiple races on the 2000 census. Not only do
American Indians and Asians tend to have
higher intermarriage rates than blacks (Es-
chbach 1995, Heaton & Albrecht 1996, Lee &
Fernandez 1998, Sandefur & McKinnel 1986),
but these numerically smaller populations are
most affected by conversions to multiracial
reporting. The 2000 census data indicate that
about 40% of American Indians and 14% of
Asians are multiracial, whereas only 5% of
African Americans (and 3% of whites) selected
more than one race. This is all the more
remarkable as the proportion of the population
identifying as black with some degree of non-
black ancestry is at least three-quarters and
perhaps closer to 90% (Davis 1991).
Another concern about the shift to multiple-
race data collection was voiced largely within
technical circles of academic demographers and
government analysts. This was the question of
how multiple-race statistics could be used to
monitor and enforce civil rights laws that were
based on a single-race classiﬁcation system that
unequivocally distinguished between those who
were members of minority groups and those who
were not. In response, in 2000 the Ofﬁce of
Management and Budget issued ‘‘allocation
rules’’ or guidelines for the use of multiple-race
data by civil-rights enforcement agencies. Under
these rules, ‘‘if the enforcement action [was] in
response to a complaint’’, one should ‘‘allocate to
the race that the complainant alleges the dis-
crimination was based on’’ (OMB 2000, Section
II, pp. 161–162). In other words, for civil rights
purposes, people who marked ‘‘white’’ and a
non-white race should be counted as members of
the non-white group, whereas mixed-race indivi-
duals without white ancestry were to be treated as
having whichever racial afﬁliation they claimed
was the basis for discrimination. In the unlikely
event that a case turned on how the multiracial
population was counted, the data should be
presented in the light most favourable to the
plaintiff in a civil rights action. Thus, a systematic
reallocation of multiple responses back to single-
race categories was in order.
Although the government’s move to permit
multiple-race reporting garnered considerable
press attention in the period surrounding the
2000 census, and might be considered a topic of
controversy, it does not represent in any way a
rejection of the policy of enumerating by race.
Instead, the revised federal standards retain the
fundamental presumption that Americans
should be classiﬁed by race. Although some
multiracial activists have suggested that recogni-
tion of the multiracial population will eventually
entail a rejection of the race concept (e.g., Daniel
2002) – for example, by revealing the malle-
ability of racial boundaries – that calculation
seems quite far in the future.
Multiple-race classiﬁcation might, how-
ever, raise public suspicion of race categories if
it comes to be seen as extending afﬁrmative
action beneﬁts to people who do not ‘‘deserve’’
them: namely, mixed-race individuals who
would identify themselves as white on single-
race forms. This concern is not trivial: according
to one study, some 60 to 80% of those likely to
mark more than one race choose ‘‘white’’ when
asked to mark only a single race.7 In this light, it
is hard to imagine that a court case will not arise
in which the eligibility for afﬁrmative action of a
mixed-race person will be challenged, particu-
larly if it can be shown that that person had in
the past identiﬁed himself as white. Again,
however, this points to the likelihood of
controversy over the implementation of racial
preferences, rather than a rejection of the
principle of racial classiﬁcation.
Debate about the use of race as a
proxy for disadvantage
A related challenge to the application of racial
statistics to antidiscrimination policy is the
argument that minority racial status per se is a
poor proxy for socioeconomic disadvantage.
Racial groups are hardly homogeneous in terms
of life outcomes. For example, one Asian
American group (Koreans) has the highest rate
of business formation in the nation, and another
(Laotians) has the lowest (La Noue & Sullivan
2001). Different rates of achievement among
Latino groups (Cuban relative to Puerto Ricans
or Mexican Americans) and blacks (American-
born relative to West Indian or African) can also
be observed in education and income (Graham,
2002), not to mention differences in the degree of
discrimination suffered. This inequality within
categories may thus result in most preferences
and opportunities going to the most advantaged
ethnicities within each category: an employer
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required to implement an afﬁrmative action
programme will usually consider the proportion
of blacks, Hispanics and Asians within his
workforce, but he remains perfectly free to recruit
only West Indians and no native-born American
black, only middle-class Cubans and no Puerto
Rican, only Chinese and Japanese applicants and
no individual from the Indochinese peninsula,
and so on and so forth. Again, the concerns
revolve around the issue who – if anyone –
‘‘deserves’’ the beneﬁt of racial preferences.
Debate about collection of data on
race
Although Americans routinely identify their
race on records in settings as varied as those of
school, the work place, and the medical ofﬁce,
this widespread collection of racial data has
occasionally been challenged.
One ground for questioning the collection
of race data has been the argument that race is
not ‘‘real’’, and thus should not ﬁgure on ofﬁcial
forms. The American Anthropological Associa-
tion argued this view in its 1997 statement on the
proposals to revise Statistical Directive 15:
The American Anthropological Association recommends
the elimination of the term ‘‘race’’ from OMB Directive 15
during the planning for the 2010Census. During the past 50
years, ‘‘race’’ has been scientiﬁcally proven to not be a real,
natural phenomenon. More speciﬁc, social categories such
as ‘‘ethnicity’’ or ‘‘ethnic group’’ are more salient for
scientiﬁc purposes and have fewer of the negative, racist
connotations for which the concept of race was developed.
(American Anthropological Association, 1997)
This depiction of the race concept as being
scientiﬁcally ungrounded is in fact shared by the
OMB and Census Bureau. The text of the
original Directive 15 read in part: ‘‘These
classiﬁcations should not be interpreted as being
scientiﬁc or anthropological in nature’’; simi-
larly, the Census Bureau maintains that its
categories ‘‘generally reﬂect a social deﬁnition
of race recognised in this country. They do not
conform to any biological, anthropological or
genetic criteria’’ (US Census Bureau 2001).
However, this contention on the part of aca-
demics and census ofﬁcials that race is not a
biological phenomenon appears to have had
little effect in cultivating public opposition to the
use of racial classiﬁcation.
A more highly publicised attempt to disman-
tle the state apparatus of racial categorisation has
been launched by anorganisation called theRacial
Privacy Initiative. In 2003, the organisation
brought a measure (Proposition 54) banning state
racial classiﬁcation to referendum in California.
The proposition was that: ‘‘The state shall not
classify any individual by race, ethnicity, colour or
national origin in the operation of public educa-
tion, public contracting or public employment.’’
Although the measure was defeated at the polls in
California, the Initiative’s founder, Ward Con-
nerly, has begun work on putting a similar
proposition to the voters of Michigan.
In its supporting material, the authors of
Proposition 54 echo some of the American
Anthropological Association’s dismissal of race,
claiming their proposal will ‘‘junk a 17th-century
racial classiﬁcation system that has no place in
21st-century America’’ (Racial Privacy Initiative,
2003). However, the primary motivation of their
efforts is not that racial categorisation is un-
scientiﬁc, but rather that it is the basis for
implementing state afﬁrmative action policies.
Indeed, Ward Connerly previously led the
successful effort to strike down state afﬁrmative
action programmes in California in 1996; the text
of his Proposition 209 read in part: ‘‘The state
shall not discriminate against or grant preferen-
tial treatment to any individual or group on the
basis of race, sex, colour, ethnicity or national
origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting.’’ As this
text makes clear, the main goal of the Racial
Privacy Initiative’s founder is the elimination of
race-based preferences. Accordingly, the Initia-
tive’s website prominently argues:
The California Constitution forbids state government from
discriminating against or granting preferential treatment to
any citizen based on race. Therefore, since government has
no reason to classify persons by race, why should it even ask
us for the data? Like religion, marital status or sexual
orientation, race should become a private matter that is no
business of government’s. Think how refreshing it would be
to throw out the entire system of checking little boxes.
As themost ethnically diverse state in theUnion,
California has the most to gain by compelling its
government to treat all citizens equally and
without regard to race.
In short, eliminating ‘‘the entire system of
checking little boxes’’ emerged as a logical
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extension of the pre-existing drive toward
preventing the government from granting pre-
ferential treatment on the basis of race – which is
equated here with racial discrimination.
The relative lack of importance of the racial
statistics themselves, however, is evident in the
little-noticed fact that theRacial Privacy Initiative
calls only for a selective erasure of racial
categories. Proposition 54 emphasised the re-
moval of race from consideration in ‘‘public
education, public contracting, and public employ-
ment’’ – the three sites where afﬁrmative action
policieswere once in effect andmight be reinstated
at some point, or so its supporters fear. At the
same time, though, the Proposition indeﬁnitely
exempted from its purview medical research and
criminal enforcement (including prison adminis-
tration). In other words, the Racial Privacy
Initiative foresees no problem for the application
of race to medicine and crime, retaining the
longstanding spirit of racial essentialism that
expects racial differences in health outcomes and
criminality. These exemptions make clear the fact
that it is not racial classiﬁcation per se that the
Initiative’s supporters ﬁnd noxious.
True, objection to afﬁrmative action plans
may be the wedge that ultimately serves to
prohibit state collection of race data for any
purpose, including the monitoring and identiﬁ-
cation of discriminatory patterns in employ-
ment, housing, education and the like. Given the
centrality of race to Americans’ understanding
of the social world, however, it is more likely
that racial statistics will be retained even if
afﬁrmative action is rolled back. If the past is
any indication, the use of racial categories in the
United States does not necessarily depend on the
existence of statistically grounded, strongly
enforced antidiscrimination policies.
Conclusion
The United States’ collection of race-classiﬁed
data can be likened to a double-edged sword. On
one hand, the analysis of racial statistics has
contributed signiﬁcantly to the civil rights assault
on centuries-old practices of exclusion in the
social, economic, and political spheres. Statistical
portraits of racial groups’ differing experiences in
schooling, housing, the labour market, and
elsewhere held up a mirror to a nation that few
Americans wanted to face. The reﬂection con-
tinues to startle: for example, sociologist Devah
Pager’s recent ﬁnding that whites with criminal
records are more likely to be considered for
employment than blacks with clean records has
been widely reported in the media (Pager 2003).
On the other hand, the collection of data on
‘‘race’’ arose from – and may help perpetuate –
longstanding American beliefs in the reality and
signiﬁcance of race (Morning 2004).
At any rate, more than any autonomous
political challenge to the principle of govern-
ment race classiﬁcation, what has emerged
powerfully in recent years – as indicated by the
debate on the introduction of multiple-race
identiﬁcation and its side effects – is an aware-
ness of tensions between ‘‘the requirements of
bureaucratic rationality’’ and ‘‘the vagaries of
personal identity’’ (Skerry 2000, p. 6), the needs
of the civil rights enforcementmachinery and the
emerging claim of Americans’ ‘‘right’’ to self-
deﬁne racially as they see ﬁt – in short, between
the politics of distribution and the politics of
recognition. As Kenneth Prewitt, the former
Director of the Census Bureau, has put it, ‘‘The
current [post-2000] classiﬁcation has too many
categories for practices using statistical propor-
tionality yet too few to accommodate the
pressures of identity politics and the desire for
separate recognition. A taxonomy that has both
few and too many categories is inherently
unstable’’ (Prewitt 2001, p. 9).
If that conﬂict is resolved, the politics of
recognition may ultimately prevail. At least that
much was intimated by a recent reversal of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
longstanding reliance on employer observation
as a way of handling the racial identiﬁcation of
employees. In June 2003, the EEOC published
new rules in the Federal Register specifying that
‘‘Self-identiﬁcation is the preferred method of
identifying the race and ethnic information
necessary for the EEO-1 report. Employers are
strongly encouraged to rely on employee self-
identiﬁcation to obtain this information. If self-
identiﬁcation is not feasible, (. . .) observer
identiﬁcation may be used to obtain this
information’’ (EEOC 2003, p. 34967). Techni-
cally speaking, the EEOC is only following the
lead of the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget,
which had taken the position several years
earlier that since ‘‘respect for individual dignity
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should guide the processes and methods for
collecting data on race and ethnicity (. . .),
ideally, respondent self-identiﬁcation should
be facilitated to the greatest extent possible’’
(OMB 1995, p. 44692). And it is in large part
a side-effect of the introduction of multiple-
race identiﬁcation in the 1997 standards: as
a practical matter, asking third parties to
guess whether a person is mixed-race, and if
so, what the person’s component races are, is
asking an impossible task. Yet the move toward
employee self-identiﬁcation is a meaningful
shift because self-identiﬁed race is not likely as
relevant to the occurrence of discrimination as
employer-identiﬁed race. In other words, an
employer who discriminates does so on the basis
of his or her perception of the worker or
applicant’s race, not according to that employ-
ee’s racial self-identity.
The growing acceptance of the principle of
racial self-identiﬁcation, and particularly the
realisation that it may not yield the same results
as external identiﬁcation, may usher in a newway
of thinking about race in the United States. By
recognising the malleable and context-dependent
nature of racial identity, its socially constructed
origins might eventually become widely apparent
to the American public, and race might become a
social status akin to ethnicity. In that event, the
group categories whose roots stem from a racially
oppressive state regime might remain weapons in
the public-policy battle against discrimination, or
they might simply fade into the political and
social irrelevance that ethnicity largely enjoys
today. As the American Anthropological Asso-
ciation argued in its 1997 brief against the use of
racial classiﬁcations, ‘‘today’s ethnicities are
yesterday’s races’’.
Notes
1. Other ‘‘suspect’’ classiﬁcations
triggering strict scrutiny are those
based on national origin
(Hernandez v. State of Texas, 347
US 475 (1954)), alienage (Graham
v. Richardson, 403 US 365 (1971))
and birth illegitimacy (Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 US 68 (1968)).
2. SeeKorematsu v. United States,
323 US 214 (1944), at 216; San
Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1
(1973), at 16–17. When there is no
‘‘suspect’’ classiﬁcation involved,
heightened scrutiny is not
triggered and the Court only
subjects the law to a ‘‘rational
basis’’ review. Under this test,
courts presume the law is
constitutional and will uphold it if
they can ﬁnd that it is a rational
means of advancing any legitimate
state interest.
3. See, e.g., Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,
438 US 265 (1978) (an afﬁrmative
action programme in university
admissions that considers race as a
‘‘plus’’ without establishing a
quota is permissible under the
Equal Protection Clause); Miller
v. Johnson, 515 US 900 (1995)
(taking race into account
within a redistricting process is
constitutionally allowed so long as
race is not the ‘‘predominant’’
factor).
4. Miller v. Johnson, 515 US 900
(1995), at 916. In Bush v. Vera,
517 US 952 (1996), at 967, the
Supreme Court ruled that in order
to determine whether a state has
made race the ‘‘predominant
factor’’ in the redistricting
process, it should be considered
‘‘evidentially signiﬁcant’’ if the
racial data compiled is ‘‘more
detailed’’ than the data the state
claims to have used to identify
non-racial ‘‘communities of
interest’’.
5. Yet, ‘‘greater differences in
selection rate may not constitute
adverse impact where the
differences are based on small
numbers and are not statistically
signiﬁcant, or where special
recruiting or other programmes
cause the pool of minority or
female candidates to be atypical of
the normal pool of applicants
from that group’’ (ibid.).
Disparate-impact analysis is
feasible only in those cases in
which the total number of
minority group members applying
for a job is high enough for the
potential discrepancies between
their success rates on the tests
involved and that of white
applicants to be statistically
signiﬁcant. This condition is
usually met as far as lower-middle
class occupations are concerned
(ﬁre-ﬁghters, policemen,
truck-drivers . . .), but not for
those more prestigious positions
to which access is often regulated
by ‘‘subjective’’ recruitment
procedures (e.g., interviews) that
cannot always be translated into a
quantiﬁed assessment. This is
clearly one of the factors that
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accounts for the ‘‘glass ceiling’’
preventing those minority group
members speciﬁcally protected
against indirect discrimination
by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act from reaching the upper
levels of private sector
management.
6. In the same year, the Court
ruled in International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States (431
US 324) that proportional
representation of blacks in
non-skilled jobs could be
considered as a reference
point in the process of eradicating
the discrimination held
unlawful under Title VII. In that
case, the Court approved the use
of statistics comparing workforce
data with the demographics of the
surrounding metropolitan area to
prove employment discrimination
and identify the extent of the
wrong to be remedied.
7. Insofar as the National Health
Interview Survey (NHIS) – which
included a follow-up question on
primary racial identiﬁcation –
provides an indicator of how
respondents would have reported
their race on the census form in
2000 absent the revisions to
the collection and tabulation
methods, the minority assignment
rule correctly assigns only about
half of respondents reporting as
black and white, 34.6% of those
reporting as Asian and white, and
only 12.4% of those who
identiﬁed as American Indian and
white (Harrison 2002). Besides,
not only does the reallocation
procedure not conform to the
single races that respondents
would self-identify; it does not
necessarily map individuals to the
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